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Abstract 
The authors argue that in order for Germany to do justice to its claim of 
outlawing lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) internationally, the 
Federal Government should first define the term “human control”, for 
example in a strategic document from the Federal Ministry of Defence. The 
aim should be to facilitate the regulation of the development and use of 
LAWS – at the international level – thus making the issue of military 
robotics politically manageable. 
The international framework for negotiating the regulation of LAWS is 
currently the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
A Common Position of the EU member states that demands human control 
– or, better still, suggests proposals for its design – could have a decisive 
influence on the negotiations. 
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Issues and Recommendations 
Preventive Regulation of 
Autonomous Weapon Systems. 
Need for Action by Germany at 
Various Levels 
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are 
weapons that do not require human intervention in 
order to select and engage a target. This principle is 
already being used in air defence today, but refers to 
simple and clearly structured environments. LAWS, 
on the other hand, would be able to operate in com-
plex, dynamic environments. 
This has been enabled by recent developments 
in sensor technology, computing power, and soft-
ware capabilities. Especially relevant are mathematic 
methods, which are often summarised under the 
term “artificial intelligence” (AI). 
Technology determines our everyday life, and we 
ought to reassess our relation to it constantly. This 
also applies to the intersection of technology and 
security policy: The question of the deployment and 
disarmament of nuclear weapons as well as the ques-
tion of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, that 
is, security in cyberspace, are representative of the 
large number of topics that are reflected in social and 
political debates. With robotics and the application 
of AI, new technologies are finding their way into 
current debates on military and international security 
policy. 
With the possibility of autonomous vehicles roam-
ing Germany’s roads in the future, it becomes obvious 
that the necessary technology and its use must be 
subject to certain rules in order to guarantee general 
safety and compliance with legal requirements. Will 
this also apply to the use of autonomous weapon sys-
tems? This question and the underlying technological, 
legal, ethical, and security aspects are the subject of 
debate at the international level. 
This study first briefly outlines the extent to which 
autonomous weapon systems are the subject of politi-
cal debate. It then examines the possible effects of the 
development and use of LAWS. On this basis, it exam-
ines the debates on the regulation of LAWS at the in-
ternational, European, and national levels and derives 
recommendations for action by the Bundestag and 
the Federal Government. It focusses on three perspec-
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tives: the technological-operational, the legal, and 
the ethical. 
From a technological-operational point of view, 
unmanned weapon systems – especially those with 
autonomous functions – are important because they 
change the military approach in combat, for example 
by requiring fewer personnel during deployment. Con-
trol of an unmanned system is not tied to the battle-
field; systems with autonomous functions require 
only one supervisor, who may observe an entire swarm 
of robots. The elimination of the communication link 
also enables shorter response times and operations in 
hard-to-reach areas. At the same time, this new tech-
nology necessitates the adjustment of military struc-
tures and processes in order to take full advantage 
of opportunities and to minimise possible risks. 
International humanitarian law is particularly 
relevant to the legal considerations of autonomous 
weapon systems. Here, principles such as the require-
ment to distinguish between civilians and combatants 
(discrimination), the proportionality of means and 
ends, and the military necessity for the use of force 
apply. Some considerations can already be made 
in the run-up to an attack; others must be decided 
during the actual situation. Especially in dynamic 
decision-making cycles in the selection of military 
targets (targeting cycle), legal concerns arise when 
using LAWS. So far, there have been no technical 
solutions for the conversion of abstract legal concepts 
(such as the principle of discrimination) into machine 
rules – but even if this were possible, the human 
being would remain the legal subject and must there-
fore make the decision. This calls for sufficient 
human control in the targeting cycle. 
From an ethical perspective, LAWS are particularly 
problematic with regard to human dignity, because 
robots do not understand what it means to kill a 
human being. Without this capacity for reflection, 
however, the human being selected as the target 
becomes a data point, that is, just an object. The use 
of autonomous weapon systems would thus violate 
the dignity of the victim – even technical improve-
ments cannot solve this problem. 
Consideration of these technological-operational, 
legal, and ethical perspectives show that a potential 
change in the nature of warfare emerges when 
humans cede the decision to use force – that is, to 
kill people – to machines. Despite operational ad-
vantages, the problematic consequences predominate 
– human control is indispensable. A consensus for 
this principle of human control is emerging, both 
internationally and in Germany, but the concrete 
form of legal regulations is unclear or controversial. 
The Federal Government’s advocacy for a ban on 
weapons without human control under international 
law is therefore still called for. It would be helpful for 
the Federal Government to take a position on how it 
understands the term “human control”, for example 
in a strategy document of the Federal Ministry of 
Defence (BMVg). The aim should be to make it pos-
sible to regulate the development and deployment 
of LAWS – at the international level – thus making 
the issue of military robotics politically manageable. 
The international framework for negotiating the 
regulation of LAWS is currently the United Nations 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). 
The meetings of the CCW States Parties thus form the 
forum in which a norm for human control over the 
use of force should be created. A Common Position 
of the member states of the European Union (EU) that 
demands this human control – or, better still, sug-
gests proposals for its design – could have a decisive 
influence on the negotiations. 
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The debate about the development and use of robots 
has changed in recent years. Autonomous vehicles 
are a mainstream topic in German industrial policy, 
and applications of AI have found their way into 
commercial and military hardware and software: 
New smartphones are equipped with hardware for 
AI applications; algorithms are learning and playing 
computer games and classic board games better than 
humans. Data-driven machine-learning opens up the 
potential for new applications in almost all areas of 
life. In April and November 2018, the European Com-
mission and the German Federal Government pub-
lished dedicated AI strategies1 for the first time. It 
comes as no surprise that national and international 
political debates have become more intense and 
multi-faceted. However, they mainly are taking place 
with regard to civilian use of AI, for example in the 
German Ethics Commission on Automated Driving. 
The military implications, on the other hand, are 
hardly discussed by the general public. 
The German Bundestag, too, has not yet decidedly 
addressed the security policy and international law 
challenges of military robotics. In contrast, the Bel-
gian Parliament, for example, passed a resolution 
 
1 See European Commission, Communication from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions: Artificial Intelligence for Europe {SWD(2018) 
137final}, 25 April 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/ 
regdoc/rep/1/2018/EN/COM-2018-237-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
(accessed 22 February 2019); Deutsche Bundesregierung, Stra-
tegie Künstliche Intelligenz der Bundesregierung (Berlin, November 
2018), https://www.bmbf.de/files/Nationale_KI-Strategie.pdf 
(accessed 7 December 2018). 
calling for a ban on autonomous weapons in June 
2018.2 
In September 2018, the European Parliament (EP) 
adopted its first resolution on autonomous weapon 
systems, which is not binding for the member states. 
 
Definitions 
Where complex issues require scientific, social, and 
political classification, generally accepted definitions 
help. A major problem in the debate on the civilian and 
military use of AI and robotics is precisely the lack of 
such definitions. This study uses the general term “un-
manned military system” (UMS) for any form of military 
robotic hardware, be it remote-controlled or equipped 
with autonomous functions. In the context of inter-
national discussions on these systems, the United Nations 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has taken 
up the term “LAWS” (lethal autonomous weapon sys-
tems), which we use specifically for weapon systems with 
autonomous functions. At the technical level, we do not 
speak of “autonomous weapon systems”, but of “weapon 
systems with autonomous functions”, since it is not the 
degree of autonomy that is relevant, but the functions in 
which the human being is supported or replaced by the 
machine. 
 
The more attention the issue draws internationally, 
the more necessary it becomes for the German Par-
liament to address it in order to grasp the security 
and arms control implications of the technology. 
 
2 See Chambre des Représentants de Belgique, DOC 54 
3203/001, 27 June 2018, http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/ 
54/3203/54K3203001.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
Autonomous Weapon 
Systems As the Subject of 
Political Debate 
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Political reflection on autonomy in 
weapon systems is still in its 
infancy in Germany. 
After all, the Bundeswehr already includes more 
automated and partly autonomous weapon systems 
in its force planning and could be confronted with 
these systems in alliances or on the battlefield. While 
the Federal Foreign Office has been helping to shape 
the international debate since 2013, for example 
within the framework of the CCW, the political 
debate in the German Parliament has focussed almost 
exclusively on armed drones. A hearing in the Sub-
committee on Disarmament and Arms Control in 
2016 was the exception. The approval by the Bundes-
tag in the summer of 2018 for the procurement of 
drones that are able to carry arms (bewaffnungsfähig) 
leaves numerous technical and organisational ques-
tions unanswered (training and education of the 
armed forces, procurement of ammunition, etc.). 
It also remains unclear what political impact this 
procurement project will have on the use of autono-
mous functions in future generations of aerial 
weapon systems. 
The concept of degrees of autonomy further com-
plicates the debate on military robotics. How exactly 
individual degrees of autonomy can be defined and 
which consequences result from it is completely 
unclear. Robots are neither under complete human 
control nor fully autonomous. The people who oper-
ate them are supported to a considerable degree by 
assistance systems that control important tasks. This 
alone blurs the boundaries between terms such as 
“automated”, “semi-autonomous”, and “autono-
mous”, which are often used in political debates. 
 The Development and Use of Weapon Systems with Autonomous Functions: Political and Military Implications 
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The technology of unmanned systems can be used for 
both civilian and military purposes (dual use). Since 
the civilian market for robotics is considerably larger, 
many technical components of military applications 
(e.g. sensors and software) originate from civilian 
developments. This circumstance not only challenges 
the civil clause3 of German universities, it also pre-
cludes export controls, the prevention of prolifera-
tion, and verification: The individual components 
can be procured on the civilian market and adapted 
to military purposes with relatively little effort. 
“Unmanned systems” or “robots” can mean both 
remote-controlled and autonomous machines; this 
study focusses on the latter. In that regard, technol-
ogies such as remote-controlled drones are only 
relevant as precursors. Machine autonomy means 
that the machine can perform certain tasks without 
human intervention in dynamic environments. 
A prerequisite for this ability are the techniques 
of AI, a generic term for numerous programming 
methods. The contents of this field of research are 
constantly changing but are always based on math-
ematical, often statistical, methods. The experts in AI 
research disagree as to whether, and when, it will be 
possible to replicate human intelligence. Currently, 
the competences of software surpass specific human 
abilities, but they do not form a human-like spirit. 
 
3 The Civil Clause refers to passages in the statutes of 
German universities or higher education institutions that 
restrict their research to purely civilian applications. Among 
other things, questions of dual-use applications are contro-
versial, that is, whether technology development should be 
carried out even if military use is already apparent. 
The emphasis is therefore more on the artificial 
aspect than on the intelligence, so the term “artificial 
intelligence” should be used sparingly and carefully. 
The procedures of AI are crucial for the implemen-
tation of autonomous functions of machines. Machine-
learning4 in particular requires a large amount of 
relevant, (pre-)structured data to train the mathemati-
cal models. Since the 2000s, these data can easily be 
obtained on the Internet for certain applications; 
the Internet of Things (IoT)5 will further increase the 
availability of data. However, this does not apply to 
the same extent to data for the training of machine-
learning military systems, since these data cannot be 
obtained from civilian life, or only to a very limited 
extent. 
 
4 Machine learning describes a series of mathematical-
statistical procedures in which algorithms search for simi-
larities or patterns in large amounts of data. For example, 
they can be used to classify objects, but also to find new 
rules. A good overview is provided by Ben Buchanan and 
Taylor Miller, Machine Learning for Policymakers. What It Is and 
Why It Matters, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 
2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/ 
publication/MachineLearningforPolicymakers.pdf (accessed 
14 January 2019). 
5 The term “Internet of Things” describes the networking 
of technical devices, such as household appliances, via data 
connections with the Internet. Manufacturers promise users 
better usability and synergy effects in interaction with other 
devices. At the same time, such IoT devices can collect and 
transmit a large amount of data. Since they are always on-
line, there is also a risk that such devices could be attacked 
electronically via the Internet. 
The Development and Use of 
Weapon Systems with Autono-
mous Functions: Political and 
Military Implications 
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Inexpensive storage systems, increased computing 
power, and big data have enabled machine-learning 
to enter everyday life. The application of these tech-
nologies can now be found in many sectors: in the 
services sector, in insurance and finance, in civil ser-
vice such as the criminal police, but also in science 
and research. For some years now, AI procedures have 
also been used in the armed forces, for example in 
assistance systems on ships or in the evaluation of 
image data from reconnaissance drones.6 
Machine Autonomy and Human Control 
From a legal – but especially from an operational – 
perspective on weapon systems with autonomous 
functions, the human–machine relationship is of 
great importance. A crucial determination is the 
design of the human role during operations, that is, 
how much autonomy is granted to the weapon sys-
tem and what does the human being decide. There-
fore, for a long time, the question of a suitable defi-
nition of autonomy dominated national and inter-
national debates – combined with a fuzzy definition 
of what exactly LAWS are. The multilateral discussion 
process on these weapon systems at the CCW reflects 
this process well: In the CCW debate, and successively 
also in media coverage, the necessity for human con-
trol over such systems has moved to the centre of 
attention. This concept can be derived directly from 
international humanitarian law and the necessity for 
making certain decisions about the use of force. How-
ever, the debate is shaped by a few scenarios, such as 
the fully autonomous drone7 or the mobile combat 
 
6 The Pentagon’s Maven project, in collaboration with 
Google, attracted particular attention with regard to the 
evaluation of image data. Under pressure from Google staff 
and public reporting, Google will not extend this collabo-
ration with the Pentagon beyond 2019. See Daisuke Waka-
bayashi and Scott Shane, “Google Will Not Renew Pentagon 
Contract That Upset Employees”, The New York Times, 1 June 
2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/ 
google-pentagon-project-maven.html/ (accessed 7 December 
2018). 
7 An example of this is the British Taranis (BAE) Demon-
strator Project. The following interview with the Chief 
Engineer for Armed UAVs at BAE Systems provides an in-
sight into the project: Beth Stevenson, “ANALYSIS: Taranis 
Developers Reveal Test Flight Specifics”, Flight Global, 16 May 
2016, https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/analysis-
robot,8 although such scenarios have only limited 
predictive power with regard to the technical devel-
opment and deployment of future LAWS. Of greater 
relevance are developments in the software sector 
(especially deep neural networks and AI),9 in swarm 
systems, and in assistance systems for human–
machine teaming. In order to take into account the 
various technological developments, many actors are 
calling for a general ban on the development and use 
of LAWS to prohibit the transfer of the decision to 
kill to a robot. 
However, this focus on the functions of target 
selection and engagement – coined “critical func-
tions” by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross – leaves a broad grey area. For example, the 
decision to kill and the execution of this action are 
not necessarily contained within one single autono-
mous robot. Instead, they can be performed in a 
complex weapon system, a so-called system of sys-
tems, by different parts. The exact responsibilities 
may become unclear. 
Assistance systems blur the lines 
between remote control, automation, 
and autonomy. 
Even more problematic are assistance systems such 
as those already in use in civilian and military appli-
cations. They take certain decisions away from people 
or prepare them and filter the collected data in order 
to offer options for making decisions. It is question-
able whether humans can actually comprehend the 
information or the way in which these options were 
created by algorithms. This shift in competence is a 
 
taranis-developers-reveal-test-flight-spec-425347/ (accessed 
7 December 2018). 
8 The following article gives a brief overview on the devel-
opment of a remote-controlled, armed Russian tank: Florian 
Rötzer, “Russischer Kampfroboterpanzer soll bald von Armee 
eingesetzt werden”, Telepolis, 30 March 2016, https://www. 
heise.de/tp/features/Russischer-Kampfroboterpanzer-soll-bald-
von-Armee-eingesetzt-werden-3379287.html (accessed 7 De-
cember 2018). 
9 For an explanation of “deep neural networks” and “arti-
ficial intelligence”, see Marcel Dickow and Daniel Jacob, 
The Global Debate on the Future of Artificial Intelligence. The Need 
for International Regulation and Opportunities for German Foreign 
Policy, SWP Comment 23/2018 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, May 2018), https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/ 
publication/the-future-of-artificial-intelligence/ (accessed 
22 February 2019). 
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creeping development that can be seen as an inevi-
table side-effect or internal logic towards (increasing) 
autonomy. This trend towards autonomy results from 
technical, but also military considerations. 
Technically, the transfer of decision-making 
authority to machines makes sense for two reasons: 
First, in the case of a remotely controlled UMS, the 
interruption of the communication link between the 
station and the device usually leads to an abort of 
the mission, which can result in delays and dangers 
for one’s own soldiers. Second, the use of unmanned 
systems increases the amount of available data, as 
more and more sensors or units (swarms) are used. 
Humans can be overwhelmed by this flood of infor-
mation, leading to assistance systems already being 
used today as filters. As the amount of data increases, 
these systems will be given more and more decision-
making authority, while human operators will 
become supervisors. 
Both aspects are also relevant for military considera-
tions and will be amplified by the increasing speed of 
operations. This applies when a conflict party deploys 
LAWS, which can (or at least will soon be able to) 
react much faster than humans. In order to avoid a 
militarily disadvantage, the use of autonomous sys-
tems seems just as necessary for all others (potential 
conflict parties), at least for tactical reasons. 
The Technical State of LAWS and the 
Political Perception 
We encounter assistance systems every day while 
driving (e.g. lane departure warning systems, brake 
assist, navigation), in private life (e.g. on mobile 
devices, such as Apple’s Siri and Microsoft’s Cortana), 
and in the work environment (e.g. in production pro-
cesses and logistics). For some people, those assistants 
have become such a natural part of life that they are 
no longer fully aware of their influence on decision-
making processes. 
This underestimation is accompanied by a partial 
overestimation of the cognitive abilities of machines, 
especially robots. The immense mathematical and 
algorithmic effort needed to convey a sufficient image 
of the environment to a robot is usually only known 
by experts. The fact that the informed and very hu-
man-like answers of Alexa and similar programmes 
are not based on a general machine intelligence 
but composed of pre-programmed, individual cases 
usually remains hidden from the user. The limited 
applicability of the underlying mathematical models 
becomes apparent only when curious answers are 
given to questions that contain subtle context.10 
Machine intelligence has no understanding of the 
environment (cognition) and will not for at least 
the foreseeable future. 
These technical limitations also apply to the mili-
tary use of such systems. In recent years, an incom-
plete picture of the possibilities, challenges, and risks 
of LAWS has emerged, which is reflected in German 
as well as international debates on the regulation of 
LAWS. In particular, the role of assistance systems in 
political debates is hardly emphasised, although they 
are almost ubiquitous in the civilian world and play 
a major role in determining the functionality of sys-
tems. Since assistance systems blur the line between 
distinctions such as “automated” and “fully autono-
mous”, leaving a grey area, they should be considered 
in a regulation (see page 8, last paragraph). 
At the same time, CCW States Parties have ex-
pressed their expectations that techniques such as 
AI will improve the implementation of principles of 
international humanitarian law in the use of force. 
Such principles are the requirements for discrimina-
tion (military versus civilian population), the propor-
tionality of means and ends, and military necessity. 
These terms are defined in a legally abstract manner 
and are context-bound, which makes their implemen-
tation in machine rules more difficult – perhaps 
even impossible. But even if this is achieved one day, 
the human remains the legal subject and must there-
fore make the decision. Such a legal decision requires 
sufficient human control in the decision-making 
cycle during the selection of military targets, the so-
called targeting cycle.11 
 
10 See Tom B. Brown, Dandelion Mané, Aurko Roy, Martín 
Abadi and Justin Gilmer, “Adversarial Patch”, 31st Conference 
on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2017), 17 May 2018, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.09665.pdf (accessed 7 October 
2018). 
11 For a more detailed discussion of the process of target 
selection in connection with autonomous functions in 
weapon systems, see International Panel on the Regulation 
of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW), Focus on Technology and 
Application of Autonomous Weapons (August 2017), https:// 
www.ipraw.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/2017-08-17_ 
iPRAW_Focus-On-Report-1.pdf (accessed 18 January 2019); 
Merel Ekelhof, Autonomous Weapons: Operationalizing Meaning-
ful Human Control (15 August 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/ 
law-and-policy/2018/08/15/autonomous-weapons-
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In addition, the principles of international law are 
ethical – and thus human – concepts of the humani-
tarian regulation of war and therefore not reproduc-
ible by a machine. Nevertheless, planners in armed 
forces are hoping for algorithms to be developed that 
can, for example, distinguish between military per-
sonnel and civilians better than humans.12 This is 
often based on the idea that ethical-humanitarian 
requirements can be translated into machine rules 
and causal relationships, even if the machine is only 
intended to support the human in weighing them 
up.13 This may actually be conceivable in some cases 
under bounded conditions, for example in simply 
structured environments without humans present. 
Such special cases are often generalised, though. 
Furthermore, the assumption that those special cases 
exist may be wrong due to changes in the environ-
ment or an adversary’s tactics. This aspect has been 
neglected in the CCW discussions so far. 
Following the assumption of the calculability of 
the world – usually called digitisation and robotisa-
tion – it is easily overlooked that a human, and thus 
its actions, is anything but calculable. This is one of 
the greatest challenges of human–machine inter-
 
operationalizing-meaningful-human-control/ (accessed 
18 January 2019). 
12 This position is particularly clearly represented by the 
United States, see United States of America, CCW/GGE.1/ 
2017/WP.6, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, 10 November 2017, 
3, https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/ 
99487114803FA99EC12581D40065E90A/$file/2017_ 
GGEonLAWS_WP6_USA.pdf (accessed 11 December 2017). 
13 See Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous 
Robots (Boca Raton, 2009). 
action, whether cooperative (i.e. the machine pro-
vides information to its operator in combat) or un-
cooperative (i.e. the machine remains intransparent 
to the opposing side) – this challenge is only vaguely 
reflected in the political debate. 
Effects on the Armed Forces 
Robots change military procedures in combat by 
requiring fewer personnel in the field: In principle, 
unmanned systems can be controlled from anywhere 
in the world; with increasing autonomy, a single 
“operator” is theoretically sufficient to monitor entire 
swarms of robots. Land robots, in particular, can sup-
port soldiers, and they already enable operations that 
are too dangerous for humans. Nevertheless, robots 
not only have advantages. Often-cited arguments such 
as cost-savings, reduced personnel deployment, and 
greater precision during operation are not always 
true. In addition, the argument of protecting one’s 
own armed forces often prevents other aspects from 
being taken into account, and thus from being 
weighed up. 
Recent research14 has shown that robotics and vul-
nerabilities in data rooms and “command and con-
trol” infrastructures are linked at both the tactical 
and strategic levels. In the absence of human oppo-
nents, conflict parties could resort to the technologi-
cal infrastructure of the other side as a target for 
attack. Typical users of robots, namely technologically 
advanced states, are particularly vulnerable because 
they are dependent on these structures. 
Growing Data Volumes and 
Machine-Learning 
Robots, especially learning systems, require a large 
amount of sensor and training data to function prop-
erly. This creates both quantitative and qualitative 
challenges. First of all, it is generally questionable 
whether more sensor technology, and thus more data, 
actually enables more consistent and predictable 
machine behaviour or better human decisions. At a 
 
14 See United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 
The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: 
Autonomous Weapon Systems and Cyber Operations (Geneva, 
2017), http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/autonomous-
weapon-systems-and-cyber-operations-en-690.pdf (accessed 
7 December 2018). 
The targeting cycle 
The decision-making cycle for dynamic target selection 
by the US military is described here as an example. This 
consists of six steps, namely: 
1) Find: Searching for targets that meet initial criteria in 
designated areas 
2) Fix: Identifying, locating, prioritising, and classifying 
of target 
3) Track: Continuous tracking of target 
4) Target: Determining desired effect, developing 
targeting solution, getting legal approval to engage 
5) Engage: Strike target with determined and approved 
weapon 
6) Assess: Review the effects of the engagement 
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certain point, the flood of information can unsettle 
decision-makers, cause inconsistencies, and delay 
decisions. This is why modern robotic systems use 
sensor data fusion and information filtering. The 
choice of filter method is critical for the result and 
can complicate the attribution of responsibility. If 
filters influence the information that reaches the 
operator or commander in such a way without being 
controllable by humans themselves, it is doubtful 
whether there is a significant level of control, and 
thus whether attributable decisions can be made in 
the field. 
The regulation of LAWS has to take 
into account the data basis of 
learning systems. 
Data-driven algorithms also raise the question of 
the representativeness and neutrality of the training 
data. The results of the mathematical methods used 
depend to a large extent on whether the training data 
correspond to the application. If the training data is 
distorted, the algorithms fail in the application and 
produce unpredictable results. Research on the civil-
ian use of training data already shows such limita-
tions today.15 
Also unsolved is the question of how military train-
ing data for learning systems can be generated to a 
sufficient extent and representativeness. Although 
the Internet and the IoT are steady suppliers of pre-
structured civilian data, such data sets are lacking 
for military applications. The creation of synthetic 
training data could provide a remedy. However, it is 
also subject to man-made models of the real world. 
Synthetic training data thus remain erroneous and 
incomplete, especially when it comes to unpredicta-
ble interactions in (real) conflict situations. 
This could be a starting point for the regulation 
of LAWS under international law: to deal (first of all) 
with the data necessary for weapon systems as well as 
their acquisition and use. 
 
15 See Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski and Jeff Clune, “Deep 
Neural Networks Are Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predic-
tions for Unrecognizable Images”, Computer Vision and Pattern 
Recognition, 2015, http://www.evolvingai.org/files/DNNsEasily 
Fooled_cvpr15.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
Military Operations and Structures 
Although creating a reliable supply of suitable train-
ing data can be difficult, the use of unmanned sys-
tems leads to a real flood of information for the user. 
This has an impact on military structures and deci-
sion-making processes. 
At the lowest levels, decision-makers could be over-
whelmed by the growing flood of information. To 
avoid the increasing transfer of competences to com-
puters (see section on problems with assistance 
systems, page 10), soldiers must be trained according-
ly. The demands on the cognitive abilities of the per-
sonnel are thus increasing. This is unproblematic as 
long as only a small section of the armed forces is 
using robotic systems. If the machines replace not 
only older transport systems, but also manned fighter 
jets, tanks, and ships, there is a need for action: If 
decisions are to remain comprehensible and control-
lable for humans, the density of information – and 
thus the complexity of decisions – will increase. This 
increase in complexity is changing the demands being 
placed on humans: Either only highly qualified per-
sonnel – who may be difficult to find – can be hired, 
or tasks that require greater intellectual demands 
must be bundled and transferred to a higher hierar-
chical level. This would change the recruitment 
strategies of armed forces. 
Not only would there be new demands for higher 
hierarchical levels or technical specialists, but also 
for cooperation between humans and machines in 
the field. Even remote-controlled robots are some-
times perceived differently in the armed forces than 
conventional weapons and tools;16 robotic systems 
with autonomous functions now show that they 
change communication behaviour and social relation-
ships in military units. Sociological research on these 
phenomena has mainly focussed on civilian fields of 
application. The results are not directly transferable 
to the use of weapon systems, but they are significant 
for the design of the human–machine interface. 
Communication problems arise again and again, even 
when using the technology for interpersonal commu-
nication, despite the corresponding technical lan-
guage and fixed communication processes. The inter-
actions of soldiers and robots in the field via speech 
and movement – and not just the operation of the 
machine – are therefore not only a technical chal-
 
16 See Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution 
and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (London, 2009). 
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lenge; it must also be taken into account in the train-
ing of soldiers. 
Due to the technical complexity of robotic systems, 
armed forces will become even more dependent on 
private companies in the future. For example, for 
reasons of safety, the Heron drone leased by the Bun-
deswehr may only be launched and landed by the 
manufacturer’s personnel. The infrastructure for the 
data transmission of remote-controlled systems is also 
often privately owned, because a military satellite 
network with sufficient bandwidth would be too ex-
pensive. Although these specific cases would not 
apply to fully autonomous systems, from an opera-
tional-military point of view, at least, the option for 
remote control is necessary. Moreover, dependence 
on private-sector expertise will not diminish. On the 
contrary, the influence of civilian enterprises, espe-
cially civilian programmers, on military applications 
is growing. For example, the Federal Ministry of 
Defence and German defence companies are dis-
cussing the possibility of delegating certain tasks in 
the area of cyber security and defence to civilian 
companies, because well-trained experts in military 
high technology are in short supply. 
The Influence of Technical Possibilities 
on Political Decisions 
The use of weapon systems with autonomous func-
tions raises the question of lowered thresholds for the 
use of force. The CCW debate shows that some of the 
technologically advanced states in this field, such as 
the United States, assess such effects in their armed 
forces. Even not knowing the results of their analyses, 
it can be said that States Parties in the CCW empha-
sise the necessity for human control in the use of 
LAWS. However, because the extent of human control 
required has not yet been sufficiently determined, the 
consequences for warfare itself and for the (political 
and military) threshold for the use of force remain 
largely unknown. 
This is even more problematic because there have 
been no published empirical studies on the possible 
lowering of the military threshold for the use of force. 
The joystick mentality, much quoted in the 2000s 
and early 2010s, has rather been replaced by a debate 
about post-traumatic stress disorders in pilots.17 
 
17 With the advent of the first armed drones remotely con-
trolled via satellite, the suspicion arose that the long distance 
LAWS could lead to a lowering of the 
military – and above all the political – 
threshold for the use of force. 
From a political science perspective, however, 
there are indications that unmanned weapon systems 
increase the probability of armed conflicts, that is, 
they lower the political threshold for the use of force. 
The German political scientists Sauer and Schörnig 
argue, for example, on the basis of the theory of 
democratic peace,18 that unmanned military systems 
appear more attractive to democracies than other 
weapons, and can thus also lower the threshold for 
military deployment. The interest of democracies in 
UMSs lies in the fact that the political actors estimate 
the actual and political costs to be lower than with 
other weapon systems. According to Sauer and Schör-
nig, it is above all the lower number of losses of their 
own troops and less – or at least less visible – collat-
eral damage that make (remote-controlled) military 
robots appear more attractive and could, in the long 
term, lower the political threshold for the use of 
force.19 
In the German discourses on the justification for 
the use of armed drones, the protection of one’s own 
troops is the dominant argument, as opposed to new 
forms of deployment.20 However, both remote-con-
trolled and autonomous systems can represent an 
even stronger dissociation from warfare than in for-
mer times – in addition to physical and emotional 
 
between the pilot and the scene as well as the computer-based 
user interface of the drones could lead to an uninhibited use 
of weapons. This so-called joystick mentality has not yet 
been proven. In fact, however, the proximity to the potential 
human target created by the long observation period, as well 
as the regular alternation between duty and leisure time, 
that is, between military and domestic environments, seem 
to increase the stress level of the crew and lead increasingly 
to post-traumatic stress disorders. 
18 The theory of democratic peace, which goes back to 
Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace of 1795, originally assumed 
that democratic states would not wage wars. Today it appears 
more likely that democracies will wage fewer wars against 
each other than against states that are not democratically 
organised. 
19 See Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig, “Killer Drones: 
The ‘Silver Bullet’ of Democratic Warfare?”, Security Dialogue 
43, no. 4 (August 2012): 363–80. 
20 See Deutscher Bundestag, Beschaffung von Kampfdrohnen 
umstritten (30 June 2014), https://www.bundestag.de/ 
dokumente/textarchiv/2014/kw27_pa_verteidigung/283434 
(accessed 7 December 2018). 
 The Security Policy Implications of LAWS 
 SWP Berlin 
 Preventive Regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 March 2019 
 15 
dissociation, now also intellectual dissociation. 
Remote-controlled systems have already allowed for 
operations that would not have taken place using 
manned systems. The physical removal of soldiers 
facilitated targeted killings by the Central Intelligence 
Agency as an essential component of the US strategy 
in the fight against terrorism. With troops on the 
ground, their own losses would have been much 
higher; a permanent presence of fighter jets on the 
ground would have meant an obvious violation of the 
sovereignty of third countries. Thus, the technology 
of armed drones prepares the ground for a strategy 
that weakens geographical and temporal limits in 
the fight against international terrorism, and thus ex-
tends the interpretation of an armed conflict. On the 
other hand, the number of visible victims decreases, 
which shifts conflicts below the publicly perceived or 
legal threshold, and thus makes it more difficult to 
control the military.21 
The Security Policy Implications of LAWS 
UMSs are not only difficult for international humani-
tarian law to grasp, they can also cause security prob-
lems and pose major challenges to efforts towards 
arms control. Due to the dual-use character described 
above, the proliferation potential is high, but too strict 
trade restrictions could, in turn, hamper the develop-
ment of useful and peaceful civilian technology. 
From the point of view of security policy, concerns 
arise with regard to international stability: With the 
growing autonomy of unmanned systems, the speed 
of their actions during operations increases, whereas 
the predictability of their behaviour decreases, since 
this is based, for example, on learning algorithms. 
Misjudgements by the robotic weapon systems can 
therefore hardly be corrected, which might lead to 
an escalation of the conflict in crisis situations.22 In 
addition, high-tech upgrading leads to a spiralling of 
arms build-ups – after all, for some states, technologi-
cal superiority is at the core of their military doc-
 
21 So far, political science, for example, has often assumed 
a definition of war based on the number of deaths (greater 
than 1,000). If wars with major losses due to UMSs become 
less frequent, the definition might have to be changed 
accordingly. 
22 See Jürgen Altmann and Frank Sauer, “Autonomous 
Weapon Systems and Strategic Stability”, Survival 59, no. 5 
(2017): 117–42. 
trine.23 At the CCW expert meetings that have taken 
place so far, these aspects have been hardly discussed; 
human rights have also played a subordinate role in 
the talks. International regulation on the develop-
ment and use of LAWS could nevertheless have miti-
gating effects on the risks described without explicitly 
addressing them. For example, certain forms of 
human control in the targeting cycle would limit the 
machine speed in combat and could therefore miti-
gate escalation risks in military conflict. 
 
23 See Jean-Marc Rickli, Some Considerations of the Impact of 
LAWS on International Security: Strategic Stability, Non-State Actors 
and Future Prospects (16 April 2015), http://www.unog.ch/ 
80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/B6E6B974512402 
BEC1257E2E0036AAF1/$file/2015_LAWS_MX_Rickli_Corr.pdf 
(accessed 17 January 2019). 
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The United Nations 
The intergovernmental debate on robotics is about 
technological, international, ethical, and security 
aspects. The focus is on military applications, whereas 
the regulation of civilian robots is mainly discussed 
at the national level, partly also at the European 
level. So far, two forums of the United Nations (UN) 
have been used for the debate on the military use of 
autonomous systems: the Human Rights Council and 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 
The Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights 
Council, Christof Heyns, addressed LAWS in his 
report of 2013 and is clearly opposed to its develop-
ment and use.24 
As a result of his concerns, the regulation of LAWS 
has been discussed since 2014, mainly within the 
CCW. With regard to the mandate of the CCW, this 
debate is strongly focussed on international humani-
tarian law. Although the participants in the meetings 
have also discussed other topics, such as ethics and 
international stability, these topics will play a sub-
ordinate role in the possible regulation of LAWS. 
Such regulation could have different legal and 
political effects and, for example, be adopted in the 
form of an additional protocol to the existing con-
vention. Comparable additional protocols already 
exist for weapons with non-detectable fragments, 
landmines, incendiary weapons, blinding laser weap-
ons, and explosive remnants of war ammunition. 
However, the aim of talks or negotiation processes 
that are started in the CCW and continued – in this 
or another forum – is often the subject of political 
debate itself, as is the appropriate forum itself. For 
 
24 See United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 
Christof Heyns, A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013), http://www.ohchr. 
org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session 
23/A-HRC-23-47_en.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
example, negotiations on cluster munitions and anti-
personnel mines also began in the CCW, but in the 
absence of a consensus, the agreements were finally 
adopted outside the CCW by states that were prepared 
to do so. It is important that the existing CCW proto-
cols do not generally prohibit the aforementioned 
types of weapons, but merely limit their use in order 
to ensure compliance with international humanitari-
an law (in particular for the protection of civilians). 
To date, the CCW has only achieved a single preventive 
ban on the use of blinding laser weapons. 
Since 2014, the CCW has held three informal meet-
ings of experts on LAWS and three meetings of gov-
ernment experts with representatives of states, non-
governmental organisations, and experts. The aim of 
these meetings was to show the state representatives 
the technical possibilities – with their advantages 
and disadvantages – and thus create the basis for an 
informed debate on a possible regulation of LAWS. 
The necessity for regulating LAWS 
is controversial – but also the 
subject of regulation. 
In the CCW debate, three strands of discussion are 
central: firstly, the question of the general necessity 
for international regulation; secondly, the precise defi-
nition of LAWS as the starting point for regulation; 
and thirdly, further criteria for possible regulation. 
With regard to the first line of discussion, it can be 
stated that the benefits of regulation are already con-
troversial. For example, a ban on the development of 
LAWS would be conceivable, but it could at the same 
time hinder the civil development of autonomous 
systems. It therefore seems more practical to restrict 
the use of LAWS, even if the systems could then be 
used in individual cases. A “weaker” solution would 
be national moratoriums on the development of 
LAWS or a joint political declaration on elements of 
The Regulation of LAWS: 
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regulation until comprehensive (international) regula-
tion is developed. 
Before formulating a definition of LAWS – repre-
senting the second focal point in the CCW debate – 
there is the fundamental question of whether a defi-
nition is necessary, or even possible. Many states are 
of the opinion that a working definition is sufficient 
for the time being. 
In formulating the definition, the difficulties relate 
to all elements of the term “LAWS”: “lethal”, “autono-
mous”, and “weapon system”. The focus of the debate 
is on the definition of autonomy. If it is very broadly 
defined, existing systems could also be included and 
would possibly have to be prohibited. The majority 
of CCW members, including the Federal Republic of 
Germany, reject this. One possible solution would be 
to set a deadline. Unmanned systems that were devel-
oped and used before then would not be covered by 
the prohibition. It is unclear whether software up-
dates of existing systems would be allowed, because 
they could relatively easily increase autonomy with-
out necessarily giving more control. As with many 
considerations concerning the autonomous functions 
of machines, a verification problem would also arise 
here if a binding regulation were to provide for a 
verification mechanism at all. 
In order to circumvent this problem at least par-
tially, the concept of “meaningful human control” 
prevailed as a conceivable criterion of regulation in 
the course of the CCW meetings. This represents the 
third strand of the debate within the CCW. This con-
cept means that the operator is sufficiently informed 
about the context of use and can realistically assess 
and, if necessary, change the actions of the machine 
and the consequences of the use of weapons during 
the process of selecting and engaging targets.25 This 
would also ensure that the necessary humanitarian 
considerations under international law would be 
carried out by human beings and not be delegated 
to the machine, or even neglected. 
Some experts in the CCW process have argued that 
the regulation of LAWS should focus on individual 
functions of the machine rather than include a com-
prehensive definition of autonomy.26 This refers to 
 
25 See Heather Roff and Richard Moyes, Key Elements of 
Meaningful Human Control, Article 36, April 2016, http:// 
www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-2016-
FINAL.pdf (accessed 14 January 2019). 
26 See Chris Jenks, The Confusion and Distraction of Full 
Autonomy – Presentation at the CCW [Informal] Expert Meeting on 
functions that are necessary for the selection of 
targets and the use of weapons and are therefore 
considered particularly problematic for compliance 
with international humanitarian law (“critical func-
tions”). In such decisions, a person must always have 
control in order to make the necessary judgements 
under international law regarding the appropriate-
ness of the military means used and the distinction 
between the military and the civilian population. It is 
questionable, however, whether other factors are not 
also relevant for exerting significant human control.27 
A consideration beyond international humanitarian 
law in particular suggests that other characteristics 
of weapons platforms, such as range, speed, operation 
time, and armament type, should be taken into ac-
count. The analysis of these criteria could, among 
other things, illustrate the risk of arms dynamics or 
the escalation of a conflict and serve as a role model. 
The design of the man-machine interface and the type 
of automated data evaluation are also relevant for 
these two phenomena (arms dynamics, conflict esca-
lation), but their operationalisation is difficult.28 
Although the CCW process focusses on international 
humanitarian law, that is, the legal dimension of 
LAWS, the ethical dimension also plays a significant 
role in the debate. On the one hand, written and cus-
tomary law are often the result of ethical ideas; on 
 
LAWS, April 2016, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ 
%28httpAssets%29/7197832D3E3E935AC1257F9B004E2BD0/ 
$file/Jenks+CCW+Remarks+Final.pdf (accessed 7 December 
2018); also International Committee of the Red Cross, Views 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on Autono-
mous Weapon Systems (11 April 2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/ 
document/views-icrc-autonomous-weapon-system (accessed 
7 December 2018). 
27 On technical and operational factors (and others) 
see International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous 
Weapons (iPRAW), Focus on the Human–Machine Relation 
in LAWS, (March 2018), 9–13, https://www.ipraw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/2018-03-29_iPRAW_Focus-On-
Report-3.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
28 See Marcel Dickow et al., First Steps towards a 
Multidimensional Autonomy Risk Assessment (MARA) in Weapons 
Systems, SWP Working Paper (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, December 2015), http://www.swp-berlin.org/ 
fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/FG03_WP05_ 
2015_MARA.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018); Anja Dahl-
mann, “Getting a Grasp of LAWS? What Quantitative 
Indicator-Based Approaches Could Bring to the Debate”, 
in Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems – Technology, Definition, 
Ethics, Law and Security, ed. German Federal Foreign Office, 
(Berlin, 2017), 36–43. 
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the other hand, there is a reference to the Martens 
Clause in the preamble of the CCW. It states that 
custom, public conscience, and the principles of 
humanity can serve as sources for international 
humanitarian law, if no other regulation applies. 
Some opinion polls try to approach the public 
conscience empirically; all, however, show inherent 
methodological weaknesses. Thus, the surveys are 
generally not representative of the entire world popu-
lation, and the questions, whether intentional or not, 
are often formulated suggestively. In addition, sur-
veys do not sufficiently represent the public con-
science; they are fuelled, for example, by the media 
debates and public quarrels on the topic.29 
Autonomy in weapon systems 
would violate the human dignity of 
the victims. 
However, the central question of the ethical debate 
is the violation of human dignity by autonomous 
weapon systems. Dignity is an integral part of human-
ity. It presupposes that man is never made an object 
or becomes a means to an end. If the decision to kill 
is made in war, it is therefore important that a morally 
acting person understands and reflects that he/she is 
taking the life of another person. A machine cannot 
act morally because it lacks the understanding of mor-
tality and the value of life.30 The use of autonomous 
weapon systems would thus violate the dignity of the 
victims, whether members of the armed forces or the 
civilian population – even technical improvements/ 
technological progress cannot solve this problem. 
As far as the perspectives of those involved in the 
CCW process are concerned, it could produce differ-
ent results – not all are equally likely. A new Proto-
col to the Arms Convention with a legally binding 
ban on the development and use of LAWS would be 
the most comprehensive solution – but it is unlikely 
in view of the progress of the talks. So far, 28 states 
have spoken out in favour of such a ban,31 but many 
 
29 For an overview of the topic, see Human Rights Watch, 
Heed the Call (21 August 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2018/08/21/heed-call/moral-and-legal-imperative-ban-killer-
robots (accessed 5 December 2018). 
30 See iPRAW, Focus on Ethical Implications for a Regulation of 
LAWS (August 2018), 12, https://www.ipraw.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/08/2018-08-17_iPRAW_Focus-On-Report-4.pdf 
(accessed 5 December 2018). 
31 See Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Country Views on 
Killer Robots (22 November 2018), https://www.stopkiller 
are sceptical or explicitly opposed to any form of 
regulation in the CCW. The line of conflict can be 
clearly identified by the criterion of whether a state 
has the possibilities and expressed interest in devel-
oping and deploying LAWS. The United States, South 
Korea, Israel, and also Russia are against a ban, 
whereas many developing and emerging countries 
are in favour of it. 
The consensus principle within the CCW therefore 
will most likely lead to a compromise solution. This 
could be made through a political declaration, as pro-
posed by Germany and France in 2017.32 It could lay 
down essential principles, such as those of human 
control, and formulate in more detail how states 
should implement them. The “possible guiding prin-
ciples”33 adopted by the CCW States Parties in August 
2018 do not explicitly exclude such a next step to-
wards a political declaration – on the contrary: They 
represent a first cautious and non-binding attempt 
towards an agreement. 
The diplomats are negotiating under time pressure 
because, on the one hand, technical development is 
progressing, and the United States and Australia, for 
example, are investing significant financial resources 
into the development of weapon systems with autono-
mous functions. On the other hand, if no agreement 
is reached within the next one to two years, the nego-
tiation process could be transferred to another forum 
(outside the UN). This was already the case with the 
 
robots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/KRC_CountryViews 
22Nov2018.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
32 A draft for this political declaration is not yet available 
(as of early March 2019); Germany and France have sub-
mitted the proposal in a joint working paper and several 
statements during the CCW talks: France and Germany, 
For Consideration by the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) – CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.4 
(7 November 2017), http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/ 
images/documents/Disarmament-fora/ccw/2017/gge/ 
documents/WP4.pdf (accessed 15 January 2019). 
By the end of 2018, however, the United States, for example, 
had explicitly spoken out against a political declaration of 
any kind in the CCW, which would be politically binding 
for it, as for most signatory states. 
33 See 2018 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), Report of the 2018 
Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technol-
ogies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems – CCW/ 
GGE.1/2018/3 (23 October 2018), https://www.unog.ch/ 
80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/20092911F6495FA7C125830
E003F9A5B/$file/CCW_GGE.1_2018_3_final.pdf (accessed 
14 January 2019). 
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agreements on anti-personnel mines (entry into force 
in 1999) and cluster munitions (entry into force in 
2010). Although a prohibition treaty outside the UN 
could also have a normative effect, it would initially 
have no legal effect on states that are not party to it. 
The European Union 
The topic of autonomous weapon systems is also 
being discussed at the European level. In September 
2018, the European Parliament passed a resolution34 
in which it demanded, by a large majority, a ban on 
weapons that were not subject to human control 
during the use of force. The EP is also calling on the 
European Council to formulate a corresponding Com-
mon Position by the EU member states on the CCW 
process. However, this resolution has no legally bind-
ing effect, and the member states must decide for 
themselves about a Common Position. The very dif-
ferent attitudes of individual member states make 
this more difficult: The United Kingdom opposes regu-
lation, whereas Germany and France propose a middle 
course, and Austria demands a comprehensive ban. 
In the EP’s debate on the draft resolution, High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, confirmed the 
need for common principles for the use of LAWS.35 
In particular, the operation must be carried out in 
accordance with the rules of international humani-
tarian law, and decisions on the use of lethal force 
should always be taken by human beings and not 
by machines. In her speech, Mogherini referred to 
an expert group on technology issues (Global Tech 
Panel), which she set up in spring 2018. The group 
should provide answers to questions at the intersec-
tion of technology and security policy. However, the 
composition of this expert group – mainly repre-
sentatives from the private sector – suggests that 
 
34 See European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution 
of 12 September 2018 on Autonomous Weapon Systems (2018/2752 
(RSP)), (12 September 2018), Figures 2 and 4, http://www. 
europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+ 
P8-TA-2018-0341+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 22 February 
2019). 
35 See European External Action Service, Autonomous Weap-
ons Must Remain under Human Control, Mogherini Says at European 
Parliament (14 September 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50465/node/50465_de 
(accessed 7 December 2018). 
LAWS will not play a significant role.36 In an open 
letter to the High Representative in October 2018, 
several parliamentary groups in the EP therefore criti-
cised the lack of independent LAWS experts from 
science and civil society.37 The need to regulate LAWS 
was also underlined by the majority of experts invited 
to a public hearing in October 2018 by the EP’s Sub-
committee on Security and Defence (SEDE) on the role 
of AI in defence.38 
The disagreement of the EU member states regard-
ing the development and use of LAWS was publicly 
demonstrated for the first time in the design of the 
European Defence Fund. At the request of the EP, it 
should contain an exclusion list for technology areas 
that are not eligible for common funding, includ-
ing – in the eyes of some parliamentary groups – 
autonomous weapon systems. In its first version, 
therefore, it explicitly excluded the promotion of 
such technologies. The follow-up version of Novem-
ber 2018, which takes into account the position of 
the European Council, only contains a reference to 
the necessity that funded research and development 
must under no circumstances lead to weapon systems 
that violate existing international law. Meanwhile 
(March 2019) the final round of inter-institutional 
negotiations on the regulation establishing the Euro-
pean Defence Fund between the EP, the Council, and 
the European Commission has led to agreed language 
that excludes “[a]ctions for the development of lethal 
autonomous weapons without the possibility for 
meaningful human control over the selection and en-
gagement decisions when carrying out strikes against 
humans”.39 If the European Parliament and Council 
 
36 See European External Action Service, About the Global 
Tech Panel (21 September 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/ 
headquarters/headquarters-homepage/50886/about-global-
tech-panel_de (accessed 7 December 2018). 
37 See Reinhard Bütikofer et al., Letter to Federica Mogherini 
(17 October 2018), https://reinhardbuetikofer.eu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/11/Letter-to-HR-VP-on-autonomous-weapons-
and-civil-society-17_10_2018.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018). 
38 Further information on the opinions of the invited ex-
perts in the hearing at the SEDE on 10 October 2018: Euro-
pean Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/ 
en/sede/publications.html (accessed 7 December 2018). 
39 Council of the European Union, Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Euro-
pean Defence Fund (First Reading) – Progress Report (6733/1/19 
REV 1), (1 March 2019), 7, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_6733_2019_REV_1& 
from=EN (accessed 7 March 2019). 
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endorse the agreed text, the European Union will 
have created a legal instrument that defines LAWS 
and characterises it as technology that is non-eligible 
for funding, which corresponds with the EP’s call for 
banning such technology. 
Bundestag and Federal Government 
In the German debate on robotics – be it for military 
or civilian applications – the German government 
and parliament are taking their first steps. One point 
of reference is the coalition agreement signed by the 
Federal Government in 2013, in which the coalition 
partners express their intention “to work for an inter-
national ban on fully automated weapon systems 
that exclude humans from the decision to the use 
of force”,40 but also to regulate unmanned systems 
below this threshold internationally. The coalition 
agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD of 2018 
provides for a similar approach, although it uses the 
more common term “autonomous weapon systems”.41 
Foreign Minister Heiko Maas took up this international 
ban several times, but he made it clear that Germany 
is pursuing a step-by-step approach through the 
above-mentioned political declaration with the long-
term goal of a binding ban.42 
The plenum of the German Bundestag did not deal 
with the LAWS issue until the end of 2018, but the 
 
40 CDU/CSU/SPD, Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitions-
vertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 18. Legislaturperiode (2013), 
124, https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/ 
koalitionsvertrag.pdf (accessed 15 January 2019). 
41 CDU/CSU/SPD, Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa. Eine neue 
Dynamik für Deutschland. Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land. 
Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 19. Legislaturperiode 
(2018), 149, https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/ 
koalitionsvertrag_2018.pdf (accessed 15 January 2019). 
42 See Auswärtiges Amt/Heiko Maas, “Die Zukunft der 
nuklearen Ordnung – Herausforderungen für die Diplo-
matie” (27 June 2018), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 
de/newsroom/maas-fes-tiergarten-konferenz/2112704 
(accessed 18 January 2019); Auswärtiges Amt/Heiko Maas, 
“Wir müssen über Abrüstung reden”, 3 November 2018, 
https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/newsroom/maas-spiegel-
online-inf/2157268 (accessed 18 January 2019). 
In addition, the Federal Foreign Office financially supports 
the project The International Panel on the Regulation of 
Autonomous Weapons at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, Berlin. iPRAW is an interdisciplinary group of inter-
national academics and contributes to the CCW process with 
various reports on LAWS (https://www.iPRAW.org). 
subcommittee on disarmament and arms control has, 
most recently in 2015. In November 2018, however, 
the plenum dealt with the EU Defence Fund and the 
aforementioned technology exclusion list. An amend-
ment tabled by the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen parlia-
mentary group to the effect that the German govern-
ment should make every effort to put LAWS back on 
the exclusion list was referred to the committees and 
eventually rejected in January 2019. 
In the Bundeswehr, a fundamental strategic debate 
on the pros and cons of weapon systems with autono-
mous functions is also pending. While the use of 
armed, remotely controlled drones meets with approv-
al within the Bundeswehr, the view of autonomous 
systems is a different one: The soldier’s loss of control 
tends to be viewed negatively. Added to this is the 
lack of confidence in the cognitive and communica-
tive abilities of future “combat robots”. They would 
not meet the requirements of the Bundeswehr and 
would therefore diminish the benefits of this tech-
nology.43 The Federal Ministry of Defence does not 
mention military robotics in the 2016 Defence White 
Paper. In addition, there is no German (working) 
definition to define LAWS more precisely and to 
specify Germany’s position in the international nego-
tiations within the CCW. 
The civilian use of robots and AI is attracting 
greater attention and is particularly prominent in 
the Federal Government’s AI strategy44 of November 
2018. The civilian use of robotics is diverse and in-
cludes (now or in the near future) industrial robots, 
home care, autopilots, camera platforms, and delivery 
services. Especially in connection with the IoT, that 
is, the networking of objects with people and among 
each other, many opportunities and challenges arise. 
In Germany, two developments are being discussed in 
particular: the use and regulation of small drones for 
different purposes,45 and autonomous driving. 
In Germany, the automotive industry in particu-
lar is a driver for (civil) developments in robotics: 
Autonomous driving has made great progress in 
recent years.46 However, the legal requirements in 
 
43 See Jörg Wellbrink, “Mein neuer Kamerad – Haupt-
gefreiter Roboter?”, Ethik und Militär, no. 1 (2014): 52–55. 
44 See note 1. 
45 See Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infra-
struktur, Klare Regeln für Betrieb von Drohnen (2017), https:// 
www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/LF/151108-drohnen. 
html (accessed 7 December 2018). 
46 See Stefan Krempl, “‘Hochautomatisiertes’ Fahren bis 
2020 realisierbar”, heise online, 21 November 2015, http:// 
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many countries, including Germany, are still lagging 
behind, and most time forecasts have turned out to 
be unrealistic.47  
To assess LAWS, it is necessary, 
but not sufficient, to consider 
civilian developments. 
It is clear, however, that the debate on autonomous 
driving shapes the concept of autonomy and the use of 
robots in the public debate.48 In addition, the civilian 
sector anticipates possible military developments and 
identifies problems. These include the design of the 
human–machine interface and human control. To 
this end, the expectations towards autonomous sys-
tems or assistance systems – and which of these can 
realistically be fulfilled – have to be clarified. 
In the debate about civil applications, ethical ques-
tions are assuming more importance. This exceeds 
the acquisition of data for learning systems and the 
respective data protection requirements by addressing 
crucial issues such as human dignity, which can be 
violated by machine “decisions”.49 Important actors in 
the German debate on the ethics of robots in general 
– and of LAWS in particular – are the Catholic and 
Protestant churches. They have frequently organised 
conferences and discussions on this aspect of robotics 
as well as presented publications. Overall, however, 
ethical aspects only have a superficial place in the 
public debate on military robotics, but it is rarely 
well-founded. 
In the field of civilian applications, a change 
towards a more in-depth examination of ethical ques-
 
www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Hochautomatisiertes-
Fahren-bis-2020-realisierbar-3009915.html (accessed 
7 December 2018). 
47 See Fred Lambert, “Elon Musk Updates Timeline for a 
Self-driving Car, But How Does Tesla Play into It?”, electrek, 
8 December 2017, https://electrek.co/2017/12/08/elon-musk-
tesla-self-driving-timeline/ (accessed 15 January 2019). 
48 See, e.g., the study commissioned by the Federal Minis-
try of Transport and Digital Infrastructure in autumn 2015. 
Although it does not deal with social consequences, they are 
addressed in the media reaction. See among others Matthias 
Breitinger, “Der Nutzer wird’s schon annehmen”, Die Zeit 
(online), 21 September 2015, http://www.zeit.de/mobilitaet/ 
2015-09/autonomes-fahren-vernetzung-projekt/komplett 
ansicht (accessed 7 December 2018). 
49 For further information on the need to regulate artifi-
cial intelligence, see Dickow and Jacob, The Global Debate on 
the Future of Artificial Intelligence (see note 9). 
tions can be seen: In September 2016, for example, 
the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infra-
structure appointed an Ethics Commission on Auto-
mated Driving. It consisted of 14 experts from various 
fields and published guidelines for the programming 
and use of autonomous vehicles in June 2017.50 The 
guidelines deal, among other things, with liability 
issues and the weighing up of damage in the event of 
imminent accidents – a well-known dilemma that is 
given new relevance with the transfer of decisions to 
machines. The Commission’s final report also men-
tions the so-called trolley problem, a thought experi-
ment in which a person (or a machine) has to weigh 
up human lives – but lacks solutions to this prob-
lem. It is obvious that, in such cases, a human should 
make the decision. The implementation into autono-
mous weapon systems remains open, since the com-
mission does not envisage the transfer of these guide-
lines to the military use of autonomous systems.51 
However, some of the conclusions also relate to prob-
lems of military use, such as the question of human 
responsibility in the use of certain autonomous func-
tions. Neither the Federal Government nor the Bun-
destag have set up an expert committee to discuss in 
detail the ethical questions concerning the military 
use of autonomous systems or the general use of AI 
in all areas of society. To date, civil and military appli-
cations have generally been considered separately. 
 
50 See Udo Di Fabio et al., Bericht der Ethik-Kommission 
Automatisiertes und Vernetztes Fahren (June 2017), https:// 
www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Publikationen/DG/bericht-der-
ethik-kommission.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 
15 January 2019). 
51 On the technology assessment regarding UMS and 
LAWS, see Office for Technology Assessment at the German 
Bundestag (TAB), Status quo and perspectives of the military use 
of unmanned platforms Mai 2011, https://www.tab-beim-
bundestag.de/en/research/u139.html (accessed 7 December 
2018; TAB, Autonomous Weapon Systems (2017), https://www. 
tab-beim-bundestag.de/en/research/u30600.html (accessed 
7 December 2018). 
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Towards a National Strategy for the 
Regulation of LAWS 
The political, legal, and ethical questions raised by 
the development and use of LAWS are urgent and of 
great importance for the shaping of German security 
and defence policy. The answers to these questions 
will be shaped today as well as in the future by the 
public debate on the civilian applications of robots. 
If the talks and a possible negotiation process within 
the framework of the CCW progress, the existing 
political definition of the current coalition agreement 
will continue to point the way, but its content will no 
longer be sufficient. In order to be able to continue to 
actively shape the multilateral international process, 
the following is necessary: The entire Federal Govern-
ment, in particular the Federal Foreign Office and the 
Federal Ministry of Defence (MoD), must deal inten-
sively and jointly with the issue of LAWS. A resulting 
document should fulfil three tasks: 
∎ First, it should name and answer the questions 
concerning definitions. The German MoD – taking 
into account the tradition of ethics in the armed 
forces – appears to be a crucial actor in discussing 
the impact of technology on the definition of 
LAWS and vice versa. As a potential user of such 
weapon systems, it is a necessary prerequisite for 
the MoD to develop its own definition of these sys-
tems – as, for example, in Directive 3000.09 of the 
US Department of Defense – and thus address the 
political discussion.52 
 
52 See Department of Defense, Directive Number 3000.09, 
November 21, 2012 Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017, Autonomy 
in Weapon Systems (21 November 2012; revised version as of 
8 May 2017), http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/ 
DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf (accessed 7 December 2018); 
for further ideas on this recommendation, see Daniele Amo-
roso et al., Autonomy in Weapon Systems. The Military Application 
of Artificial Intelligence as Litmus Test for Germany’s New Foreign 
and Security Policy (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2018), 
∎ Second, this document should set the political and 
legal framework for the use of autonomous func-
tions in weapon systems of the German Armed 
Forces. 
∎ Third, this would align and limit existing research 
on military autonomy in a way that would respect 
existing principles of international law and take 
into account the emerging norm of human control. 
The draft of such a strategy paper of the Federal Gov-
ernment on weapon systems with autonomous func-
tions could form the basis for a parliamentary debate, 
and the principles of international law included in 
this paper could be further legitimised by a resolu-
tion. On the way there, however, some hurdles still 
have to be overcome: 
∎ First, there is still a lack of reliable knowledge 
about the underlying technology of robotics in 
some aspects of the political debate. Where scien-
tific-technological know-how is available, trans-
lation work from the technical-academic to the 
political-discursive space is still necessary. Here it 
could help to strengthen existing structures at the 
interface of science, politics, and business or, if 
necessary, to create new ones. The (military) use 
of AI in general – and of weapon systems with 
autonomous functions, in particular – will repre-
sent a political challenge for a long time, not only 
in terms of regulation. 
∎ Second, there is often a lack of tools to describe 
the specific functionalities of technology due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of the issue. The language 
used to characterise robots is often ambiguous, too 
simplistic, anthropomorphic, and judgemental. In 
addition, it perpetuates the idea that the systems 
in question possess human characteristics. Terms 
 
48–49, https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/ boell_ 
autonomy-in-weapon-systems_v04_kommentierbar_1.pdf? 
dimension1=division_oen. 
Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
 The EU As an Important Actor in the Regulation of LAWS 
 SWP Berlin 
 Preventive Regulation of Autonomous Weapon Systems 
 March 2019 
 23 
such as “decide”, “evaluate”, and “select” describe 
the purpose of the machines that is intended by 
humans, but not their actual functionality – and 
certainly not their capabilities. It is therefore advis-
able to find a language that adequately describes 
this technology and to establish it in the political 
discourse. The International Panel on the Regula-
tion of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW), for exam-
ple, proposes replacing the term “artificial intelli-
gence” with a concrete description of the algorith-
mic processes used. Although the term “machine-
learning” has prevailed in the meantime, it is 
advisable to speak of “training” and “data-driven 
algorithms” – or at least to always include this 
purely technical meaning in one’s thinking. 
∎ Thirdly, it remains inevitable that developers, mili-
tary users, and ultimately political decision-makers 
will intensively examine the nature and scope of 
the autonomous functions of weapon systems from 
ethical as well as international law perspectives. 
The creeping process towards more and more 
autonomous functions – assistance systems – re-
quires reflection at the political level, including in 
the German Bundestag. A public hearing of the 
defence committee could set important priorities 
and initiate a debate that would also highlight the 
technical background of the developments and 
the resulting military consequences. A thorough 
analysis of the respective human–machine inter-
face is particularly important. This is the only way 
to ensure that the transfer of decision-making and 
responsibility to the machine proceeds as desired 
and that human control in the targeting cycle is 
maintained. 
With the Franco-German working paper of autumn 
2017, the German government positioned itself more 
clearly with regard to a step-by-step procedure for 
achieving an international regulation of LAWS.53 
Time is running out, though, because the technologi-
cal development increases the pressure to enact regu-
lation, while at the same time many states want to 
exploit the military possibilities of those develop-
ments. This is precisely why regulation is necessary – 
which has been recognised in the German political 
debate in the meantime. 
In light of the self-formulated claim and the nor-
mative basis of German foreign policy, in particular 
in the field of arms control, it makes sense for the 
Federal Government to continue and intensify its 
 
53 See note 31. 
efforts to reach internationally binding rules. A global 
ban of LAWS as systems without human control is an 
ethical and legal imperative in view of existing inter-
national humanitarian law. Respect for human dig-
nity within the meaning of Article 1 of the Basic Law 
can only be ensured in the use of weapon systems 
with autonomous functions with this specific course 
of action, that is, by maintaining human control. 
For Germany it is about more than just a few mili-
tary advantages that come with the use of such sys-
tems, such as – and this is undisputedly a great asset 
– the protection of its own soldiers. But what is at 
stake is control over the conflict, which humanity, at 
least in part, can lose if military conflicts are fought 
by machines in the future. 
The EU As an Important Actor in the 
Regulation of LAWS 
With France and Germany, two diverging national 
positions clash on the question of regulating LAWS. 
However, the 2017 Franco-German working paper 
shows that there is a common basis for regulation: 
ensuring human control. 
Even though the goal of an international negotia-
tion process between these two partners is contro-
versial – whereas the political declaration for Berlin 
represents only a first step, Paris has not yet shown 
itself to be open to legally binding instruments – the 
focal point for a Common Position by the EU can be 
seen here. This must be expanded, sharpened, and 
then used as a critical compromise within the frame-
work of the CCW. 
The EU can take accompanying measures to main-
tain the credibility of a value-oriented European 
foreign policy. The Federal Government could take 
action in Brussels on two issues in particular: 
∎ Firstly, the EU should not fund research, for exam-
ple through the European Defence Fund, that con-
tributes indirectly or directly to the development 
of LAWS. This makes it all the more important to 
promote research aimed at ensuring human con-
trol over autonomous weapon systems while still 
preserving the potential military benefits of such 
systems. 
∎ Secondly, it is necessary to critically analyse and 
politically accompany the advancing technological 
developments in the civilian as well as military sec-
tors. In its first resolution on (civil) robotics of Feb-
ruary 2017, the EP calls for a European agency to 
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research the effects of this technology.54 The man-
date of such an agency should include interdisci-
plinary, critical research into the effects of poten-
tial military use. The EU, with its market power 
and political influence, could apply the resulting 
norms to international standardisation processes 
and ultimately towards the implementation of 
international regulation. 
The Transformation of CCW Talks into a 
Negotiation Process 
The discussion process within the CCW is increasingly 
slowing down and under threat of failing due to re-
sistance from individual states, while the same states 
continue to push technical development forward. In 
order to take account of the new challenges related to 
LAWS and mitigate its negative implications, a timely 
compromise is necessary. The focus should be on hu-
man control over the use of force in order to anchor 
it internationally as a norm. A politically binding 
declaration could help, but it poses some challenges. 
For example, it would leave many important deci-
sions at the national level for the time being, even 
though they have a global impact. In addition, it car-
ries the risk of stopping further negotiation processes. 
If the CCW States Parties agree on this option, further 
political pressure is needed to strengthen and shape 
the principle of “human control over the use of force” 
internationally. 
 
54 See European Parliament, European Parliament Resolution 
of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to the Commission on 
Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), (16 February 2017), 
Figure 16, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do? 
pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2017-0051+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
(accessed 22 February 2019). 
Abbreviations 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 
EP European Parliament 
EU European Union 
IoT Internet of Things 
iPRAW International Panel on the Regulation of 
Autonomous Weapons 
LAWS Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems 
MoD Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung) 
SEDE European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security 
and Defence 
UN United Nations 
UMS Unmanned Military System 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
